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Of the four important groups engaged 
in the preparation, use and distribution 
of corporate annual reports, namely, 
corporate management, public accoun­
tants, security analysts, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 
much of the burden of improving dis­
closure in corporate annual reports rests 
with the public accounting profession. 
The profession has been conceded that 
trust and responsibility both by the 
reluctance of other concerned groups 
and by the unique position enjoyed by 
the public accountants in the United 
States. However, the success of the 
profession in bringing about disclosure 
improvements depends much on its un­
derstanding of the users’ information re­
quirements. The principal contention of 
this paper is that at present a lack of un­
derstanding exists in the public 
accounting profession regarding infor­
mation requirements of the users of cor­
porate annual reports. Both the publish­
ed literature on the subject and an in­
vestigation carried out by this author 
support the contention.
Bridge To The 
Market Place
Gyan Chandra is Visiting Associate 
Professor of Accounting at Michigan State 
University, East Lansing, Michigan. He holds 
an M.S. degree from the University of 
Minnesota and a Ph.D. degree from the 
Ohio State University. He is a member of the 
American Accounting Association, the 
National Association of Accountants, and 
the Planning Executives Institute. He is co­
editor of the book, Budgeting for Profit, and 
has been published in a wide variety of 
professional accounting journals.
User Discontent With Corporate An­
nual Reports
Corporate annual reports provide 
management with an important vehicle 
for communication with the outside 
world. The United States Congress 
realized the importance of disclosure in 
corporate reports when it passed the 
Securities Act of 1933. In fact, the 
Securities Act has often been called a 
disclosure statute and its long title reads: 
“An Act to provide full and fair dis­
closure of the character of securities sold 
in interstate and foreign commerce and 
through the mails, and to prevent frauds 
in the sale thereof. . .”. To adminis­
ter the disclosure statute, Congress 
created the Securities and Ex­
change Commission by an act in 1934. 
Despite these and other efforts toward 
improvement the published evidence 
suggests that corporate disclosure prac­
tices have not reached a satisfactory 
stage. The investors and their 
counselors are dissatisfied with the 
published corporate reports and they 
often resort to sources other than cor­
porate financial statements for needed 
information.1 In fact, Roper in his depth 
interviews with various types of users of 
corporate statements, even detected 
bankers and analysts lacking confidence 
in corporate financial statements.2
Management’s Reluctance for 
Disclosure
Time and again the courts have held 
that the primary responsibility for the 
accuracy of information filed with the 
SEC and disseminated among investors 
rests with management.3 Management 
cannot discharge its obligations in this 
respect by employing public accoun­
tants. However, left to its own initiative 
corporate management is often reluc­
tant to disclose fully and freely to the 
corporate stockholders.4 Historically, 
corporations disclosed very little until 
the turn of the twentieth century. Of the 
957 corporations listed with the New 
York Stock Exchange in 1926 only 339 
corporations issued their annual reports 
to the stockholders then.5 Finally, the 
Exchange made the issuance of cor­
porate reports a part of its regular listing 
requirements.
There is no doubt the Securities Act 
of 1933 has improved the quality and 
quantity of disclosure in corporate re­
ports but only to the extent the Act re­
quires management to comply. For in­
stance, management has an option of fil­
ing a copy of annual report in partial 
compliance with the requirements for 
financial statements to be included in its 
10-K reports. Out of 150 corporations, 
one recent study found, only 17 cor­
porations exercised this option confir­
ming the difference between the two 
reports. The study thus commented, “If 
there are no material differences 
between two types of reports prepared 
by corporations, the efforts should not 
be duplicated by preparing a separate 
report for the SEC. But a majority of 
the corporations subject to the SEC 
filings do not exercise the option, imply­
ing that there are material differences 
between these two types of reports.”6 A 
majority of the witnesses appearing 
before the Senate Committee on Bank­
ing and Currency in June 1963 also sup­
ported the contention that corporate 
managements are little inclined to dis­
close information to investors at their 
own initiative. Since banks are not sub­
ject to SEC regulations, their annual 
reports are often both inadequate and 
uniform.7
In brief, the dissatisfaction with the 
contemporary corporate disclosure 
practices is widespread among the users
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The SEC reluctance to invoke its 
authority to prescribe accounting 
principles has only increased the 
responsibility of the public ac­
counting profession.
of corporate reports. The principal 
reason for such a discontent lies in the 
reluctance of corporate management to 
disclose adequately unless pressured by 
legislation or outside forces.
The SEC Reluctance
Though the SEC has been making 
news in recent months by taking active 
interest in the development of accoun­
ting principles, historically it has played 
a passive role in prescribing accounting 
principles. The Securities Act gives the 
SEC the authority to prescribe accoun­
ting principles in filing the financial 
statements filed with it. However, the 
commission has not, in general, exer­
cised this authority. In the past the SEC 
has been content to rely on generally 
accepted accounting principles as they 
exist or develop with the passage of 
time. The Commission has virtually left 
the task of developing sound accounting 
principles to the accounting profession. 
The public accounting profession has 
often applauded the inactive role of 
SEC for a variety of reasons.8 The com­
mission seems to believe the develop­
ment of accounting principles is in the 
domain of free enterprise and it en­
courages the accounting profession to 
take initiative in this respect. The SEC 
intervenes only in pressing exceptional 
situations.9
The Dominance of 
Public Accountants 
and Security Analysts
Through the years public accounting 
and security analysis professionals have 
emerged as the principal spokesmen of 
the preparer and user groups of publish­
ed corporate annual reports. The SEC 
reluctance to invoke its authority to 
prescribe accounting principles has only 
increased the responsibility of public ac­
counting profession in this respect. 
Notwithstanding management respon­
sibility for preparing and distributing 
corporate reports to the external users, 
the certified public accountants enjoy 
the unique privilege of determining 
what information to present to the 
stockholders and in what form. They are 
closest to the corporate management on 
preparer side and are usually grouped 
with the preparers of corporate financial 
statements. They enjoy an immensely 
important place in the organized capital 
market and not many corporations ven­
ture to publish uncertified financial 
statements or statements with qualified 
report from the public accountants. Ac­
countants enjoy what one security 
analyst calls “a point of leverage” in this 
respect.10
While discussing what each member 
of the user-preparer group could do to 
make corporate reports more 
meaningful Leonard Spacek of Arthur 
Andersen & Co. found that security 
analysts, stock exchanges, the SEC, and 
even corporate management rely on the 
corporation’s public accountant for 
adequacy and reliability of the financial 
information provided the investor. He 
comments, “Thus we have gone the full 
circle of financial statement respon­
sibility to the investor, and we end up 
with the public accountant. In the last 
resort, all others rely on him to justify 
what is adequate and reliable informa­
tion for the investor.”11
On the user side of the corporate an­
nual reports, the security analysts have 
emerged as the principal surrogates of a 
vast number of individual and in­
stitutional investors. They not only 
represent investors’ information needs 
but they are themselves major users of 
corporate financial statements. A vast 
majority of investors often obtain finan­
cial information indirectly via the 
studies prepared by the security 
analysts. Further, the analysts counsel 
on a large proportion of equity invest­
ment decisions. Security analysts repre­
sent investors because their information 
requirements are derived from the needs 
of the investors they advise.12
In brief, one finds that of the four 
principal parties involved in the 
preparation and use of corporate finan­
cial statements, namely, corporate 
management, the SEC, public accoun­
tants and security analysts, the last two 
share major responsibility. But how 
effectively the public accountants and 
security analysts can discharge their 
respective responsibilities depends on 
how much they understand each other. 
The more public accountants under­
stand the security analysts’ information 
requirements, the better they will be able 
to serve their needs. However, the in­
vestigation carried out by the author in­
dicates a lack of understanding between 
the two professions.
Accountants Understanding 
of User Information Needs
The author mailed a questionnaire to 
a group of randomly selected 300 cer­
tified public accountants working with 
the national Big Eight firms of CPAs13, 
and to 400 chartered financial analysts 
to study the extent of public accoun­
tants’ understanding of users’ informa­
tion needs. The questionnaire contained 
58 information items (see table 1 for a 
list of information items) selected from a 
review of published literature on cor­
porate accounting and security analysis. 
The questionnaire asked the 
respondents to value the significance of 
information items in equity investment 
decisions on a five point scale.14 In all, 
339 replies were received (159 out of 300 
from CPAs and 180 out of 400 from 
CFAs) giving an overall response rate of 
48.4 percent.
Test Results
The author was interested in studying 
the extent of accountants’ understan­
ding of the security analysts’ informa­
tion needs and tested the following 
hypotheses from the data collected from 
the questionnaire:
There is no significant difference 
between the public accountants and 
security analysts on the value of ac­
counting information items for 
equity investment decisions.
The hypothesis was tested in­
dividually for each information item by 
chi square test at a significance level of 5 
percent (a = .05). Table 1 summarizes 
the test results for each information 
item. Of the 58 information items tested, 
the hypothesis was rejected on 37 of 
those items. The test results revealed a 
lack of consensus between the two 
groups on the value of three types of in­
formation items.
First, there is a lack of consensus 
between the two groups on information 
concerning budgetary disclosures, e.g., 
planned capital expenditure for next 
twelve months; planned expenditure on 
research, development and exploration; 
planned expenditure on advertising and 
publicity and cash flow projections.
Second, differences exist on informa­
tion pertaining to details and 
breakdowns, namely, amount and 
breakdown of operating expenses; 
breakdown of inventory under major 
categories; investment in each sub­
sidiary company; breakdown of sales, 
net operating income, income after tax 
and investment by continent or 
hemisphere for companies with inter­
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national operations, and by operating 
division, product, line of business or 
customer groups for diversified com­
panies; terms, annual rentals and 
breakdown of long term leases by the 
type of property leased, etc.
Finally, consensus is lacking on infor­
mation items not traditionally reported 
by corporations, viz., amount expended 
on human resources; share of market in 
major product areas; both FIFO cost 
and market value of inventory; names of 
top executives, lines of authority and 
their renumeration.
Since the hypothesis was rejected for 
the following information items also it 
seems differences exist between accoun­
tants and analysts on a large number of 
popularly reported information items. 
The chi-square test value was exceeded 
for questions about amount of 
operating expenses reported; cost of 
goods sold reported; earnings per share 
reported and the method used in its 
computation; amount of inventory 
reported and the method used in its 
valuation; amount of depreciation 
reported and the method used in its 
computation; and amount of goodwill 
and other intangibles amortized.
The differences between the public ac­
countants and security analysts are not 
confined to information on projections 
alone. The two groups extend their dis­
agreements to information items per­
taining to the past, such as amount ex­
pended on research and development 
and exploration; reported capital ex­
penditure (additions to physical 
facilities); rent payment or receipts on 
long term leases and shareholders’ 
equity and the number of common 
shares outstanding.
Perhaps the most interesting results 
were found in the case of the following 
two popular items in the questionnaire: 
earning per share reported for the 
period and the method used in its com­
putation; and the source and applica­
tion of funds statements for the period. 
The proposed hypothesis was rejected 
for both of these items and the lack of 
consensus on the value of these items 
was surprising in view of the emphasis 
they receive in the literature.2 *4567810245 In accord 
with past findings the present study also 
tends to indicate that user and preparer 
groups continue to be indifferent to 
price-level adjusted corporate reports.16
2Elmo Roper, A Report on What Information 
People Want about Policies and Financial Con­
ditions of Corporations, Vol. I, (The Con­
trollership Foundation, Inc., 1948), pp. III- 
XXVIII. See also, Thomas H. Sanders, Company 
Annual Reports to Stockholders, Employees, and 
the Public, (Harvard University, 1949), pp. 181- 
226.
3Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 SEC 721 
(1939).
4See Surendra S. Singhvi, “Corporate 
Management’s Inclination To Disclose Financial 
Information,” Financial Analysts Journal, (July- 
August, 1972), pp. 1-8.
5Oscar M. Beveridge, Financial Public 
Relations, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 
1963), p. 139.
6Surendra S. Singhvi, op. cit., p. 2. See Also Sur­
endra S. Singhvi, “Disclosure to Whom? Annual 
Financial Reports to Stockholders and to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission,” Journal 
of Business, (July, 1968), pp. 347-351.
7U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking 
and Currency, Hearings Before a Subcommittee: 
SEC Legislation, 88th Congress, 1st Session. p. 
106.
8See Louis H. Rappaport, SEC Accounting 
Practice and Procedure, (The Ronald Press Co., 
Third edition, 1972), Ch. 3.
9Ibid, Ch. 3.
10See Burton, op. cit., pp. 105, 108 and 144.
11Spacek, op. cit., p. 327.
12See Horngren, op. cit., pp. 598-604; and James 
C. Stallman, “Toward Experimental Criteria for 
Judging Disclosure Improvement,” Empirical 
Research in Accounting: Selected Studies, 1969, 
p. 30.
13Namely, Arthur Andersen & Co.; Coopers & 
Lybrand; Ernst & Ernst; Haskins & Sells; Peat 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; Price Waterhouse & 
Co.; Touche Ross & Co; and Arthur Young & Co.
14The study used the following five point scale: 
Very Important (VI); Important (I); Neither Im­
portant Nor Unimportant (N); Unimportant (U); 
and Very Unimportant (VU).
15See John C. Burton, op. cit., pp. 99-100,142- 
144; and Lyn D. Pankoff and Robert L. Virgil, 
“Some Preliminary Findings from a Laboratory 
Experiment on the Usefulness of Financial Ac­
counting Information to Security Analysts,” Em­
pirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies, 
1970, pp. 10-12.
16Charles T. Horngren, “Implications for Ac­
countants of the Uses of Financial Statements by 
Security Analysts,” (Unpublished doctoral disser­
tation, University of Chicago, 1955), pp. 6-7; and 
Alan R. Cerf, Corporate Reporting and Invest­
ment Decisions, (University of California, 
Berkeley, 1961), p. 57.
17See Abraham J. Briloff, op. cit.,pp. 219-223.
Conclusion
The principal contention of this paper 
is that a lack of understanding exists in 
the public accounting profession as to 
the information requirements of the 
users of corporate annual reports. In a 
competitive economy like that of the 
United States much burden for im­
provement in corporate accounting dis­
closure rests with the public accounting 
profession. The success of the profes­
sion depends on its awareness of users’ 
information requirements.
A lack of understanding between the 
two professions could be due to a lack of 
communication between the security 
analysts and the accountants.17 Ap­
parently the half-hearted efforts made 
in the past to bring the two professional 
groups to a common understanding 
have not had much effect. Both groups 
happen to see each other as adversaries 
rather than as complementary 
professions; both professions have been 
harmed by their mutual distrust. 
Another explanation may lie in the flex­
ibility offered by the prevailing variety 
of the “generally accepted accounting 
principles.” As long as management can 
find an acceptable alternative within the 
GAAP, it can find an approving (and 
willing) public accountant also.
In a private enterprise economy the 
public accounting profession shoulders 
heavy responsibility for developing 
sound corporate disclosure practices. 
Corporate management is naturally 
reluctant to disclose much to the outside 
world. Regulatory agencies like SEC are 
also hesitant to intervene for obvious 
reasons. Independent public accoun­
tants not only carry the attest function 
but are also expected to innovate and 
improve. However, much of that in­
novation and improvement depends on 
understanding the user information — 
requirements.
Accounting professionals have an im­
pressive array of technical expertise but, 
as the present study indicates, they seem 
to be insensitive to the needs of the 
readers of financial statements. It may 
be appropriate to suggest that some 
behavioral insights into user needs are 
as essential as technical competence.
1See Corliss D. Anderson, “The Financial 
Analyst’s Needs” in Berkley Symposium on the 
Foundations of Financial Accounting, (Universi­
ty of California, Berkeley, 1967), pp. 98-109; 
Abraham J. Briloff, The Effectiveness of Account­
ing Communication, Frederick A. Praeger, 
1967), pp. 7-54; John C. Burton (ed.), Corporate 
Financial Reporting: Conflicts and Challenges, 
(American Institute of Certified Public Account­
ants, 1969), pp. 97-111; Charles T. Horngren, 
“Disclosure: 1957,” Accounting Review, (Oc­
tober, 1957), pp. 598-604; Leonard M. Savoie, 
“Meeting Financial Consumer Needs,” Financial 
Analysts Journal, (March-April, 1969), pp. 47-48; 
and Leonard Spacek, A Search for Fairness in 
Financial Reporting to the Public, (Arthur 
Andersen & Co., 1969), pp. 313-338.
Half-hearted efforts made in the 
past to bring accountants and 
security analysts to a common 
understanding have not had much 
effect. Both groups see each other 




Test Results of Hypothesis
Information Items Chi Square Statistics
1. Total assets reported, end of period (e.o.p.). 7.7083
2. Total current assets reported, e.o.p. 5.0329
3. Total current liabilities e.o.p. 4.7825 a
4. Cost of marketable securities, e.o.p. 4.8309
5. Market value of Marketable securities, e.o.p. 6.1968
6. Amount of revenue and the method used in its recognition (e.g., franchise 
business, construction firms, etc), for the period (f.t.p.).
0.0113 b
7. Operating income reported (before non-recurring gains and losses), f.t.p. 1.2890 b
8. Amount and breakdown of operating expenses reported, f.t.p. 68.4882 *R
9. Cost of goods sold reported, f.t.p. 12.0396 *R
10. Earnings per share reported f.t.p. and the method used in its computation. 8.9354 *aR
11. Compounded rate of growth in earnings per share for the last 
five to ten years.
3.6031
12. Dividend per share on common shares, f.t.p. 1.8909 a
13. Amount of inventory reported and the method used in its 
valuation, e.o.p.
9.1538 *aR
14. Breakdown of inventory reported under major categories, e.o.p. 30.8204 *R
15. Fifo cost of inventory, e.o.p. 19.0719 *R
16. Market value of inventory, e.o.p. 34.8953 *R
17. Amount of depreciation reported and the method used in its 
computation, f.t.p.
51.4687 *R
18. Amount of straight-line depreciation on long-lived assets, e.o.p. 82.7123 *R
19. Amount of accelerated depreciation on long-lived assets, f.t.p. 88.0304 *R
20. Amount of non-recurring gains and losses reported, f.t.p. 1.5608 a
21. Amount expended on human resources (e.g., hiring, training, 
etc.), if material, f.t.p.
14.2516 *R
22. Amount of past pension fund liability, if material, e.o.p. 16.9462 *R
23. Accounting method followed for research and development, and 
exploration costs.
16.6582 *R
24. Amount expanded on research, development and exploration, f.t.p. 36.4027 *R
25. Accounting method followed for advertising and publicity costs. 22.4977 *R
26. Amount expended on advertising and publicity f.t.p. 49.0298 *R
27. Accounting method (purchase vs. pooling) followed for each 
acquisition and merger completed during the period.
4.7182
28. Amount of goodwill recognized in each acquisition completed 
during the period.
3.4511
29. Amount of goodwill and other intangibles amortized, if 
material, f.t.p.
19.3622 *R
30. Amount of income tax expense, f.t.p. 11.3607 *R
31. Amount of deferred income tax liability or prepaid income tax, e.o.p. 3.2405
32. Amount of each subsidiary’s earnings and parent company’s share of 
its earnings, f.t.p.
65.2620 *R
33. Investment in each subsidiary company, e.o.p. 59.9314 *R
34. Minority interest reported in each consolidated subsidiary, e.o.p. 47.6072 *R
35. Breakdown of sales, income after tax and investment by continent 
or hemisphere (where international operations contribute over 15% of 
company’s revenues), f.t.p.
38.3400 ♦R
36. Breakdown of sales, net operating income and investment of diversified 
companies by operating division, product, line of business, or customer 
group (segmented on the basis of 15% or more contribution to gross revenue or 
operating income), f.t.p.
51.8965 *R
37. Reported capital expenditures (additions to physical facilities), f.t.p. 87.0341 *R
38. Planned capital expenditures for next twelve months. 83.2313 ♦R
39. Planned expenditure on research, development and exploration for next twelve months. 40.0120 *R
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♦ Significant at 5 percent level.
Degrees of freedom for items marked with‘a’: 3
Degrees of freedom for items marked with ‘b’: 2
Degrees of freedom for other items: 4
R= Rejection Range
40. Planned expenditure on advertising and publicity for next twelve months. 20.5958 ♦R
41. Method followed for reporting long term leases, f.t.p. 8.6002
42. Rent payments or receipts on long term leases, f.t.p. 40.0490 ♦R
43. Terms, annual rentals and breakdown of long term lease by the type of 
property leased (e.g., real estate, equipment, etc.), e.o.p.
8.8070
44. Backlog and projection of orders, e.o.p. 29.3450 ♦R
45. Productive capacity and actual output (e.g., steel mills, oil companies, 
etc.), f.t.p.
40.7108 *R
46. Extent of dependence on a few customers (e.g., defense contracts, foreign 
markets, etc.).
7.4112
47. Share of market in major product areas, f.t.p. 27.9873 ♦R
48. Total common shareholders’ equity and number of common shares 
outstanding, e.o.p.
20.4338 *aR
49. Number of stock warrants and convertible securities outstanding, e.o.p. 12.2177 *R
50. Number and type of common shareholders (e.g., individuals, institutions, 
etc.), e.o.p.
3.6915
51. Number of shares in the company owned by its officers, e.o.p. 6.9335
52. Terms of stock option plan and shares involved, e.o.p. 9.8494 ♦R
53. Amount and breakdown of preferred stock and long-term debt by type, 
dividend and interest rate and maturity, e.o.p.
4.3399
54. Contractual restrictions on common dividend, if any, e.o.p. 9.2978
55. Source and application of funds statements, f.t.p. 18.2157 ♦R
56. Cash flow projections for next two to five years. 45.6911 ♦R
57. Price-level adjusted annual corporate reports as supplementary statements. 5.5317
58. Names of top executives, lines of authority and their remuneration. 28.6310 *R
APPENDIX
Table 2
Questionnaire Responses and Present Position 
(Title) of Respondents
* Includes such titles as Vice-President, Fund 
Manager, Trust Investment Officer, Executive 
Vice-President, Consultant, Investment 
Counselor, President, Portfolio Manager, Assis­





Security Analyst —- 58
Salesman — 2
Others 14 47*
Not Given 11 12
Total responses received (1) 159 180
Questionnaires mailed (2) 300 400
Response rate (1) & (2) 53% 45%
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